What we can conclude about the current political situation is that it’s driven by emotion — Borissov’s continuing desire to remain prime minister — which now faces obstacles, alongside the growing influence of the DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms). That’s what sociologist Parvan Simeonov from Miyara said in an interview for Dnes.bg, commenting on recent political events following GERB leader Boyko Borissov’s announcement of government “transformations” and a change in the National Assembly Speaker. Later, the tone softened, as it turned out the time was “not right” for such reshuffles, and the Speaker would instead rotate. It reached the point where Delyan Peevski declared he had no ambitions to officially enter the government and would continue supporting it.
“We’ve witnessed a complex personal balance, and if there has been any reformatting, it’s simply the gradual realization that Peevski is coming, and Borissov is retreating,” Simeonov said.
According to him, neither GERB nor DPS want early elections — but in doing so, they are fueling the potential future project of President Rumen Radev. “These are gradual processes. The real conversation for Bulgaria right now is economic,” Simeonov commented, suggesting that any snap parliamentary elections would most likely take place after the presidential ones.
– From ‘government transformation’ to ‘upgrading’ and finally to nothing new — what happened?
Usually, analysts and media look for a master plan. Perhaps I’m the only one who dared to assume there wasn’t one in what Borissov did. It reveals a difficult moment of realization — that Peevski is gradually growing stronger, while Borissov’s room for maneuver is shrinking. To me, it seemed more emotional than planned — and I said so as early as Wednesday, right after that Tuesday’s events. Time has completely confirmed my hypothesis.
We often tend to attribute great depth and strategy to politicians — remember how we used to dissect every message from Ahmed Dogan, and we saw how that ended. Borissov, of course, is a very different type.
Secondly, it seems he did try something. Judging by indirect sources, there was a statement from Peevski that he wouldn’t support a cabinet with another prime minister. Apparently, Borissov was hoping for some kind of political deal — perhaps one where Peevski gains more influence in government, while Borissov becomes prime minister again. But why would Peevski do that when his moment is already coming naturally? Why empower Borissov even more?
Thirdly — and I said this from the start — if anything is happening, it’s that the government now seems to be protected by Peevski, not by Borissov. For example: can Borissov now easily replace one of his ministers? I don’t think so. It literally feels like Peevski is the protector of this government.
The main conclusion we can draw is that this is emotion — Borissov’s ongoing desire to be prime minister, blocked by the growing influence of DPS instead of his own. I suspect Borissov realizes that DPS now influences his own party. But for the moment, he doesn’t have many options: the path to PP–DB (We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria) is closed, as is the one toward Radev. This political frustration had to find an outlet — and with Borissov, it erupts either toward his own people or toward coalition partners.
There was nothing else behind it — just an attempt by Borissov to show he still matters. That kind of emotion is typical of political frustration, when you realize that a younger, more energetic politician is stepping forward while you’re forced to operate in a shrinking space.
– It seemed like politicians didn’t believe him from the start. Why was this move necessary?
When emotion takes over, you see it — he withdraws, comes back, scolds journalists. I notice some schadenfreude from PP–DB. But it’s too early for that. Borissov is a serious figure in Bulgaria’s modern political history. It’s unpleasant to watch such scenes, because it seems like he’s losing control — even over his own behavior. You can tell his party knows it must simply endure it. It’s not pleasant to watch.
– What happens next?
Borissov will have to rely on what he’s always relied on — patience. It’s possible that a future clash between Radev and Peevski could actually benefit Radev, which might later reopen space for Borissov. But for now, Borissov will need to remain polite and respectful toward Peevski — which is what he’s doing.
So, what we’re seeing is a delicate personal balance. If there’s any reformatting, it’s simply the gradual realization that Peevski is coming, and Borissov is stepping back.
– Will there be early elections? If so, when?
Everyone rushed to predict snap elections. Nothing is impossible — everything’s on the table. Even Slavi Trifonov could topple the government, though arithmetically he could be replaced. Everything’s possible. But I don’t see GERB or DPS wanting early elections. That’s one of the biggest current misconceptions. They think they’re blocking Radev — but in fact, it’s the opposite. Time now works in Radev’s favor. Every day they continue this political self-torture, they pour water into Radev’s future project.
Presidential elections in Bulgaria are always a vote of confidence or no-confidence in the current government. Usually, in the second round, a protest candidate emerges against those in power. Of course, the ruling side can try to push a radical opponent to the runoff to win, or support someone unexpected. Imagine what moves DPS could make — or even run their own candidate, as they often have in the past.
Most likely, we’ll see one candidate representing those in power (Borissov–Peevski) and another candidate against them. If Radev helps legitimize that opposition candidate, a victory there would trigger a new political situation, paving the way for early elections and possibly a new Radev-backed party — a “pro-Radev wave” in Bulgaria.
Frankly, if I were Borissov, I’d consider whether it might actually be in my interest to hold elections now — because he’d perform better now than a year from now. In a year, all the pragmatic vote might have shifted entirely to Peevski — not to mention by the end of the mandate.
– One of the main arguments against early elections is the introduction of the euro in early 2026 — no budget could be passed, and it could backfire on Bulgaria.
There was an option to hold elections now — to re-legitimize before the euro and explore new coalitions. But what new thing would elections bring? Only a stronger Peevski. There’s no need for elections; he can simply be given more power informally.
Second, if the government fell now, elections would take place in a few months — during winter — which makes little sense.
Third, it seems they want to be the ones to bring Bulgaria into the Eurozone. That’s logical. There’s also a situation where you neither hold on tightly nor let go entirely. Yes, a Radev wave could come — but the question is whether Radev can actually manage it. That’s not guaranteed.
– Many predicted Peevski would officially enter government. Do you think that will happen?
There’s no need for it to happen officially. Whenever there’s talk — even within GERB — about a minister’s resignation, Peevski steps up and says, “I fully support this minister.” End of discussion. Why would he need to enter the government officially? Maybe there’s still some fear of international reactions or Magnitsky sanctions. But the time isn’t far when Peevski might aim for the prime minister’s chair himself.
Right now, we’re witnessing a scene of generosity from DPS — but overall, their path is upward.
– Does the opposition have a chance?
The oppositions — plural. The key question is whether the opposition can find any cohesion, which is very difficult. “Velichie” and MECH show some signs that they could tolerate PP–DB in some way, but “Vazrazhdane” (Revival) remains firmly against that.
Gradually, everything is heading toward the presidential elections, where the key question in the second round will be whether there’s a candidate capable of uniting the moods of both types of opposition voters — not necessarily the parties themselves, but their supporters and the non-voters as well.
